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Preface
The Description of Game Actions in Cluedo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1–28
H.P. van Ditmarsch
Abstract
Game actions in the well-known murder game Cluedo involve interactions of
different subgroups of players, that result in complex knowledge changes. We intro-
duce a dynamic epistemic language to describe actions in Cluedo in formal detail.
This provides us with a precise description of Cluedo strategies. Optimal strategies
are not yet known.
Modified Banzhaf Index for Voting Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29–42
R. Endo,T. Matsui, K. Ano
Abstract
Voting indices may be symmetric and nonsymmetric. The Shapley-Shubik,
Banzhaf and Deegan-Packel symmetric indices have corresponding nonsymmetric
analogs. The nonsymmetric Banzaf index was proposed by Shenoy. We propose
a modification of Banzhaf index without constructing a profile space. The index
avoids problems that Shenoy’s nonsymmetric Banzhaf index has and is derived di-
rectly from data. In the paper we explain problems of Shenoy’s nonsymmetric
Banzhaf index has. For the construction we may use two kinds of data, those are
the number of seats of each party and Yea/Nay data of each party. Using these
two data, we calculate the modified Banzhaf index of each party following proposed
algorithm. As the numerical example the modified Banzhaf index of the parties
of the House of Councilors in Japan both before and after the election in 1998 is
calculated.
Classification of Matrices by Means of Envelopes for Bicriteria Matrix
Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43–52
M. Higuchi, T. Tanaka
Abstract
The paper is concerned with a multicriteria game whose payoff takes its values
in an ordered vector space. As compare with (usual) single-criterion games, we can
not so easily draw image sets of the payoff. We consider bicriteria two-person zero-
sum matrix game as a multicriteria game, in which each image set of the payoff
function is a line-segment and touches an envelope. The aim of this paper is to
classify payoff functions in the game by using envelope and to verify the results on
personal computers.
Epistemic Logic: A Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53–94
W. van der Hoek, R. Verbrugge
Abstract
Epistemic logic is the logic of knowledge: how do you reason about the question
whether your silent admirer knows that you know that (s)he sent you an anonymous
Valentine card? Is it harmful if, at a literature-exam you dont know the contents
of a chapter? No, as long as you know that the examiner does not know that you
do not know it. Knowing whether your neighbor knows that he regularly plays
his radio so loudly that you wake up during the night, may help you to solve the
problem in an appropriate way. In negotiations, it will harm you to let the other
party know your bottom-line, but it may be helpful to disclose other information
about yourself, for example about some of your values. In this article, we will use
examples and puzzles to give some flavor of the field and to demonstrate that the
notion it is known that is meaningful and interesting for researchers in theoreti-
cal computer science, artificial intelligence and game theory. First, the logics for
individual agents in a group are treated. In these, all agents may have different
information and thus different epistemic alternatives at each world. Therefore, it
is interesting to investigate how they reason about others knowledge. By adding
knowledge operators to the language, a program is derived. This is followed by a
short treatment of a logic used for authentication. Then, the semantics and axiom-
atization of different basic epistemic logics are introduced. The subject of different
types of group knowledge such as common knowledge and distributed knowledge
comes to the fore. A dynamic epistemic approach to the evolution of knowledge in
games of imperfect information is given, based on the work of Van Ditmarsch.
Multistage Arbitration Game with Random Offers . . . . . . . . . . . . 95–106
V.V. Mazalov, M. Sakaguchi, A.A. Zabelin
Abstract
We consider here a two-person time-sequential game intended to model a com-
petitive behaviors of two players who may have different aims. Suppose that the
same players I (Labor union) and II (Management) jointly employ one secretary.
We consider here a version of the arbitration problem of the following form. Let
αi, i = 1, 2, ..., n - is a sequence of random offers, interpreted here as the solution
proposed by the arbitrator in period i. As the solution comes up, players I and
II must decide whether to accept it or reject it expecting that a more favorable
solution may come up in the near future. Player I (II) is interested to maximize
(minimize) the expected payoff of the game.
Zero-sum arbitration games are considered where αi are uniformly distributed in
[0, 1] random variables and αi = (Xi, Yi) is presented by double sequence of random
offers for every players.
Game Theoretic Modeling of Hierarchical Control of Sustainable Devel-
opment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107–118
G. A. Ougolnitsky
Abstract
A conception of the hierarchical control of sustainable development based on
game-theoretic modeling is proposed. The principles of optimality of the hierarchical
control of sustainable development as solution sets of the hierarchical game-theoretic
models are formulated. The possibilities of leader’s manipulation and follower’s
counter-game are also examined. A model example is considered.
The Dummy Paradox of the Bargaining Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119–124
B. Peleg, P. Sudho¨lter
Abstract
By means of an example of a superadditive 0-normalized game, we show that the
maximum payoff to a dummy in the bargaining set may decrease when the marginal
contribution of the dummy to the grand coalition becomes positive.
New Classes of Solutions in Multistage Games with Applications to ”Pris-
oner’s” Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125–134
L. A. Petrosjan, L.V. Grauer
Abstract
Finite multistage game G with simultaneous games Γ(·) played on each stage
is considered. The definition of outcome, path in tree-graph and history are intro-
duced. The new class of Nash Solutions based on the possibilities of punishment for
the deviation on first stages of G is defined. It is shown that the outcomes under
these solutions dominate the classical subgame perfect Nash outcomes. Special case,
finite repeated ”Prisoner’s Dilemma” game is considered. For prisoner’s dilemma
the regularization procedure is introduced.
Ethical Behavior as Transformation of Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135–158
W.H. Ruckle, K. Kikuta
Abstract
We model ethical behavior as a transformation from the vector that represents
the advantage of a situation to each individual to a vector that represents the utility
of that situation considering its advantage to others. When we consider ordinal
utility we conclude that this transformation will not usually be surjective (onto.)
We use this transformation to model a few well known ethical teachings.
On Certain Generalization of Rubinstein’s Bargaining Model . 159–170
A.Rusinowska
Abstract
This paper presents the bargaining model in which the preferences of each player
are expressed by the sequence of discount rates varying in time. It appears that
Rubinstein’s theorem concerning subgame perfect equilibrium in the model with
constant discounts is not valid in the case of discount rates varying in time. An
adequate counter-example is described here. There is a theorem of subgame perfect
equilibria of a certain form in models incorporating sequences of discounts varying
in time. The subgame perfect equilibria depend on solutions of a certain infinite
system of equations. If the sequences of discount rates satisfy a certain condition,
then there is only one subgame perfect equilibrium, in which offers of players are
determined in the recurrent way and the offer of player 1 in period 0 depends on
the sum of a certain convergent series. If this condition is not satisfied, then there
are infinitely many subgame perfect equilibria. In the paper, some applications of
the bargaining problem are also presented.
Consistency and its Converse in Assignment Games . . . . . . . . . . 171–188
M. Toda
Abstract
This paper applies the Davis-Maschler type consistency axiom and its converse
to assignment games and obtains axiomatic characterizations of the core and the
SPB solution which is the intersection of the core and the kernel. The results will
be extended to non-linear assignment games.
Price Competition in Olygopoly: the Conditions of Convergence to and
deviation from Walrasian equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189–212
A. A. Vasin
Abstract
The paper discusses a game model of simultaneous price setting- e.g.Bertrand
competition- with a homogeneous good and firms heterogeneous in production ca-
pacities and costs. The interval of prices surviving the iterated elimination of weekly
dominated strategies is computed. The paper shows that this interval is a global
attractor for a wide class of adaptive dynamics including the best reply dynamics
and the fictitious play. The sufficient condition of the convergence to the Walrasian
price follows these results.
Overlapping Generations Randomly-Furcating Stochastic Differential Games:
Intertemporal Strategic Behavior under Stochastic Dynamics and Uncertain
Payoffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213–244
D.W.K Yeung
Abstract
In this paper, a new class of non-cooperative stochastic differential games in
which there are overlapping generations of players facing uncertain payoffs is pre-
sented. The introduction of additional stochastic elements via randomly branching
payoffs offers a fruitful alternative to modeling game situations under uncertainty.
The development of differential game analysis in this direction is worthwhile and
instigates the development of a paradigm of asynchronous horizons randomly fur-
cating stochastic differential games. A characterization of the solution to a general
class infinite-horizon overlapping generations furcating stochastic differential games
is obtained. An application of the game in resource management is presented.
Games as People Play and How to Form Winning Strategies . . 245–278
P.L. Yu, C.Y. ChiangLin
Abstract
In this paper, we describe how games are played by most people, not just how
the games should be played as conceived or imagined by mathematicians or scholars.
Humans play games and make decisions. Therefore, human psychology and behavior
patterns play vital roles in the games they play. We first introduce the concepts of
habitual domains and behavior mechanism as the basic tool for describing games
as people play and how people form winning or win-win strategy by restructuring
games. An anatomy of games which contains a number of parameters are introduced
to facilitate the restructuring of games as to have a win-win game situation on one
hand, and to form winning strategies on the other. Basic principles and practical
procedures for forming winning strategies are also provided.
Geometrical Properties of the Core, Subcore and Nucleolus . . . 279–289
V.V. Zakharov, A.N. Akimova
Abstract
In this paper we discuss the problem of existence of the core and subcore of TU-
cooperative game from the linear programming point of view and consider some
geometrical properties and mutual positions of the core, subcore, grand subcore,
nucleolus and proportional nucleolus. Under additional restrictions for the struc-
ture of optimal solutions’ set of considered linear programming problem sufficient
conditions have been obtained for the nucleolus to be a selector of the grand subcore.
Moreover we proved the proportional nucleolus, which is the modification of a nu-
cleolus, is a selector of the grand subcore in any balanced n-person TU-cooperative
game.
